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CoNTRAars-UsURY-DuAL CoNTRACTS DESIGNED TO EvADE UsURY PnoHIBITIONs-Plaintiff applied to the defendant finance company for a loan of
$100. The lender agreed to advance this amount and accordingly required the
plaintiff to execute a note in the sum of $ll4.04 payable in one year and
secured by a chattel mortgage on an automobile, but insisted in addition that
plaintiff purchase an investment certificate in the amount of the note, issued
by the defendant company and bearing 2 percent interest, which certificate was
to be paid for in twelve monthly instalments. Contending that the interest thus
exacted was usurious, the plaintiff brought suit for cancellation of the note and
mortgage. 1 On appeal from a judgment that the loan was not usurious, held,
affirmed with a caveat. The sale of the investment certificate was essentially a
part of the loan transaction, so that monthly instalments on the certificate were
in effect repayment of the loan and the totality of the arrangement was usurious.

l.Aror. CoNST., art. XIX, §13 provides: "All contracts for a greater rate of interest than
ten percent per annum shall be void, as to principal and interest, and the General Assembly
shall prohibit the same by law.•.•" Although this mandate is self-executing, it has been
implemented and amplified by statute. See Strickler v. State Auto Finance Co., 220 Ark.
565, 249
(2d) 307 (1952).
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But prior holdings to the contrary2 which had become a rule of property could
not be overruled retrospectively, and the judgment in the principal case was
therefore affirmed with a caveat that a similar course of dealing would henceforth be considered a single transaction and subject to the constitutional mandate against usury. O'Brien v. Atlas Finance Co., (Ark. 1954) 264 S.W. (2d)
839.8
It is well settled that where the purpose of a lender is to frame a series of
transactions devised to cloak an intent to exact excessive interest, courts will
frustrate such evasion and ascribe to the scheme its contemplated illegal purpose. 4 But the Arkansas court has consistently held that good faith collateral
contracts will not invalidate a contemporaneous loan of money as usurious,
although the practical effect of the aggregate of transactions might be to collect
more than a legal rate of interest/' even though the loan is made only on condition of the borrower's assent to the collateral agreement.6 The system of dual
contracts used in the principal case, a loan contract and simultaneous purchase
of an investment certificate, is a most palpable means of evading the constitutional limitations on interest,7 although it bears substantial similarity to approved
systems used by building and loan associations8 and _Morris Plan banks.9 The
2 Simpson v. Smith Savings Society, 178 Ark. 921, 12 S.W. (2d) 890 (1929); Hickingbotham v. Industrial Finance Corp., 192 Ark. 429, 91 S.W. (2d) 1023 (1936). In
these cases the Arkansas court found the note and the instalment investment certificate
were separate and distinct obligations, and when thus viewed and construed did not
separately disclose USUIY·
3 In a vigorous dissent, Griffin Smith, C.J., objected to the use of this "delightfully
convenient judicial sedative spoken of as a caveat" to suspend the constitutional proscriP;
tion against USUIY· Principal case at 841. Parties to similar contracts executed before the
caveat became final were held to have no constitutional right to have the new rule applied
to their transactions in Crisco v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., (Ark. 1953) 258'S.W. (2d)
551, cert. den. 346 U.S. 910, 74 S.Ct. 239 (1953). On the propriety of the caveat when
employed to announce a prospective departure from past holdings, see Lobingier, "Precedent in Legal Systems," 44 MICH. L. RBv. 955 (1946); Snyder, ''Retrospective Operation
of Overruling Decisions," 35 ILI.. L. RBv. 121 at 130 et seq. (1940); Kocourek and Koven,
''Renovation of the Common Law through Stare Decisis," 29 !LL. L. RBv. 971 (1935);
Stimson, ''Retroactivity in Law," 38 M:rcH. L. RBv. 30 (1939); Moschzisker, "Stare Decisis
in Courts of Last Resort," 37 HARv. L. RBv. 409 at 426 (1924).
4 See 2 CoNTRAcrs RBsTATEMENl' §529 (1932); 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, 2d ed.,
§1687 (1938); 6 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1501 (1951); 55 AM. ]UR., Usury §14 (1946).
5 Simpson v. Smith Savings Society, supra note 2; Hogan v. Thompson, 186 Ark.
497, 54 S.W. (2d) 303 (1932). See also 6 A.rut. L. RBv. 26 at 31 (1951).
6Leavitt v. Marathon Oil Co., 186 Ark. 1077, 57 S.W. (2d) 814 (1933). Cf. 6
CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1501, p. 946 (1951): "••• if the loan is made only on condition
that the other transaction shall accompany it, a finding of usurious intent may be justified."
7This practice was held usurious in State v. Whaley, 176 Tenn. 170, 139 S.W. (2d)
255 (1939).
s The court in the principal case made clear that its caveat did not apply to loans made
by "true" building and loan associations, as upheld in Reeve v. Ladies' Bldg. and Loan
Assn., 56 Ark. 335, 19 S.W. 917 (1892); Farmers' Savings and Bldg. and Loan Assn. v.
Ferguson, 69 Ark. 352, 63 S.W. 797 (1901).
9 Mesaba Loan Co. v. Sher, 203 Minn. 589, 282 N.W. 823 (1938); Columbus
Industrial Bank of Miller, 125 Conn. 313, 6 A. (2d) 42 (1940). For a rather comprehensive treatment of the entire area, see Collins, "Evasion and Avoidance of Usury Laws,"
8 LAw AND CoNTEM. PnoB. 54 (1941).
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device consists of a loan at a stipulated rate for the entire term and a requirement that the borrower purchase a certificate having a nominal value equal
to the amount of the loan, the purchase price being payable in periodic instalments. Since these payments are not credited on the loan, the effective rate to
the borrower is practically doubled since he has the use of the full face amount
of the loan only until the first instalment on the investment certificate is payable,
yet interest at the contract rate is collected for the entire term on the original
sum lent. Surely, the Arkansas court is right, though somewhat tardy, in
declaring this arrangement a single contract at usurious interest and clearly
within the constitutional prohibition. 10
Richard W. Young, S.Ed.

10 The Arkansas court has recently struck down a number of collateral devices as
designed to exact excessive interest: Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. v. Chandler, 218 Ark.
966, 239 S.W. (2d) 1009 (1951) (stock subscriptions); Strickler v. State Auto Finance
Co., 220 Ark. 565, 249 S.W. (2d) 307 (1952) (special charges), noted 31 TEx. L. REv.
345 (1953); Hare v. General. Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W. (2d)
973 (1952) (credit sale).

